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Abstract
This study extends the multi-country, politico-economic model of scal policy
developed by Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2012) to incorporate wage inequal-
ity within each country. In this extended framework, we present conict over scal
policy within and across generations and show that a low-inequality country real-
izes tight scal policy with low public debt accumulation, whereas a high-inequality
country experiences loose scal policy with high public debt. This model predic-
tion is consistent with empirical evidence from OECD countries for the past three
decades.
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1 Introduction
Conventional economic theory suggests that higher income inequality is associated with
a higher level of income redistribution (see, e.g., Romer, 1975; Roberts, 1977; Meltzer
and Richard, 1981). Given government budget constraints, higher inequality should in-
crease pressure on politicians to shift the scal burden from the present generation to
future generations. This pressure incentivizes politicians to nance a part of government
expenditure by issuing public debt, which may result in a higher debt-to-gross domestic
product (GDP) ratio in the long run.
The purpose of this study is to develop a simple model that examines the afore-
mentioned argument from a theoretical point of view. For this purpose, we use Song,
Storesletten, and Zilibotti's (2012) multi-country politico-economic model of public debt.
They present a two-period overlapping-generations model with many small open coun-
tries that dier in their public goods preferences. Each country decides its public goods
provision nanced by taxes and public debt through probabilistic voting, reecting the
conicting preferences of two successive generations. In this model, they show that public
goods preferences shape cross-country dierences in scal policy.
This study modies their framework by assuming away dierences in preferences
among countries and instead introduces wage inequality within each country. In this
alternative framework, we present conict over scal policy within and across generations
and show that when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (EIS) of agents is less
than one, a low-inequality country realizes tight scal policy with low public debt ac-
cumulation, whereas a high-inequality country experiences loose scal policy with high
public debt. The reverse occurs when EIS is greater than one: a higher inequality level is
associated with a lower level of public debt.
To evaluate the empirical plausibility of the two conicting model predictions, we
rst look at the evidence of inequality and public debt from Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries for the past three decades. We nd a
positive and highly signicant correlation between inequality and public debt. We also
nd that the assumption of EIS below one is in line with many empirical estimates (see,
e.g., Kydland and Prescott, 1982; Hall, 1988; Campbell and Mankiw, 1989; Browning,
Hansen, and Heckman, 1999; Campbell, 1999) based on a literature review. These two
sources of evidence suggest that EIS below one is an empirically valid prediction.
The present study contributes to the literature on the political economy of public
debt. While many studies consider how politics determines the size of public debt, most
abstract away the role of inequality among voters. Previous studies instead focus on
the roles of common pool problems (Tabellini, 1986; Velasco, 1999), political instability
(Persson and Svensson, 1989; Aghion and Bolton, 1990; Alesina and Tabellini, 1990;
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Tabellini and Alesina, 1990; Natvik, 2013), altruistic and selsh agents (de Walque and
Gevers, 2001), tax smoothing (Battaglini and Coate, 2008), and intergenerational conict
(Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti, 2012).
However, studies by Cukierman and Meltzer (1989) and Azzimonti, de Francisco, and
Quadrini (2014) are exceptions. Cukierman and Meltzer (1989) develop an overlapping-
generations model with bequest motives and income inequality, wherein high-income in-
dividuals are bequest unconstrained and indierent to the intergenerational reallocation
of taxes. By contrast, low-income individuals are bequest constrained, and thus benet
from substituting future taxes for current taxes by means of debt issued to nance gov-
ernment expenditure. In particular, when low-income individuals are decisive in voting,
they prefer a higher level of debt over a reduction of their wages.
Cukierman and Meltzer (1989) suggest a positive relationship between inequality and
public debt. However, their analysis is conned to a closed economy, ignoring cross-
country dierences in scal policy. Azzimonti, de Francisco, and Quadrini (2014) overcome
this problem by developing a multi-country model with income risk. They show that
higher risk in a home country results in more public debt issues in home and foreign
countries, and argue that public debt responds positively to income inequality, provided
that rising income inequality is associated with an increase in individual income risk.
Our study diers from that of Azzimonti, de Francisco, and Quadrini (2014) in that
we focus directly on income inequality, particularly wage inequality, and show that when
EIS is below one, rising inequality in a home country may result in an increase in its
public debt and a decrease in public debt in foreign countries. These results based on a
dierent mechanism from that in Azzimonti, de Francisco, and Quadrini (2014), could be
viewed as a component of an alternative testable hypothesis for the relationship between
inequality and public debt from a political economy perspective.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model.
Section 3 provides a characterization of political equilibrium. Section 4 demonstrates
numerical examples and discusses the implications of the results. Proofs are given in the
appendices.
2 Model
We base our model on that developed by Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2012) and
consider a discrete-time economy where time is denoted by t = 0; 1; 2;    . We assume
that the world economy consists of a unit mass of small open countries. Each country is
populated with overlapping generations of agents who live for two periods: they work in
the rst and retire in the second. Each generation has a unit mass.
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Within each generation, agents belong to either of two income classes based on their
rst-period wages: the poor or the rich. Let wpj and w
r
j denote the exogenous wages of
the poor and the rich, respectively, in country j, and let  2 (0; 1) denote the fraction of
the poor within a generation. The average income level, assumed to be identical across
countries, is denoted by w = wj  wpj + (1   )wrj . We introduce this assumption to
compare two groups of countries, high-inequality countries and low inequality countries,
which have similar average income levels but dierent levels of wage inequality.
Countries are classied into two types according to wage inequality, high and low
(j = H;L), the proportions of which are  and 1   , respectively. The wage prole
of H-type countries is WH  fwpH ; wrHg, and the wage prole of L-type countries is
WL  fwpL; wrLg; where wrH=wpH > wrL=wpL holds. The ratio of high-to-low income is higher
in high-inequality countries than in low-inequality countries.
2.1 Utility Maximization
Each agent receives utility from private consumption and publicly provided goods. The
utility of a i-type young agent in country j = fL;Hg, born in period t, is
Uyij;t =
(cyij;t)
1    1
1   +  
(gj;t)
1    1
1   +  
(
(coij;t+1)
1    1
1   +  
(g1 j;t+1)  1
1  
)
;
where cyij;t is consumption during youth, c
oi
j;t+1 is consumption during old age, gj;t is public
goods provision in period t,  2 (0; 1] is the discount factor, and (> 0) and (> 0)
capture the preference weights for public goods for the young and the elderly agents,
respectively. In particular, the parameter (> 0) captures the relative strength of the
elderly agents' preference for public goods.
The parameter (> 0) measures the elasticity of the marginal utility of its argument.
An inverse of ; 1=, measures the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (henceforth,
EIS). The case  = 1 leads to a logarithmic utility function of the form Uyijt = ln c
yi
jt +
 ln gjt +  
 
ln coijt+1 +  ln gjt+1

. We abstract this case away in the following analysis
because the eect of wage inequality on scal policy disappears under this specication,
an empirically implausible scenario.
The individual budget constraints of i-type agents during youth and old age are given
by
cyij;t + s
i
j;t  (1  j;t)  wij;
coij;t+1  Rsij;t;
where sij;t is savings, j;t is the income tax rate in period t, and R is the (endogenous) world
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interest rate. Following Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2012), we focus on stationary
equilibria and thus characterize the allocation of each country as functions of a constant
R.
We solve the utility maximization problem and obtain the following consumption and
savings functions:
cyij;t =
1
1 + (R)
1 

 (1  j;t)  wij;
coij;t+1 =
(R)
1 

1 + (R)
1 

R  (1  j;t)  wij;
sijt =
(R)
1 

1 + (R)
1 

 (1  j;t)  wij:
Ignoring irrelevant terms, we can express the indirect utility function of an i-type
young agent as:
V yij;t =
1
1   
hn
1 + (R)
1 

o
 (1  j;t)  wij	1  +   (gj;t)1  +   (gj;t+1)1 i :
The rst term on the right-hand side denotes the utility of consumption during youth and
old age, the second term denotes the utility of public goods during youth, and the third
term denotes the utility of public goods during old age.
For elderly agents in period t, their indirect utility functions are expressed as:
V orj;t = V
op
j;t = V
o
j;t =
1
1      (gj;t)
1 ;
where the irrelevant terms are omitted from the expression. All elderly agents have the
same indirect utility function regardless of their type because they have predetermined
savings during youth and we assume an individual's utility function is additively separable.
2.2 Government Budget Constraints
Government bonds are traded in international asset markets. Given inherited debt per
young agent, bj;t, the government of country j chooses the income tax rate, j;t; public
goods expenditure, gj;t; and to new issue bonds, bj;t+1; subject to the following dynamic
budget constraint:
bj;t+1 = gj;t +Rbj;t   j;t w: (1)
Governments are committed to not repudiating debt. Thus, sovereign debt cannot
exceed the present value of the maximum feasible tax revenue (i.e., the natural debt
limit). In an environment with a constant interest rate and exogenous wages, the tax
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revenue in period t is maximized at j;t = 1. Therefore, the natural debt limit, denoted
by b, is given by:
bj;t+1  b  w
R  1 :
In the following analysis, we also assume a lower bound of b, denoted as b, and an upper
bound of g, denoted as g, for technical reasons.
3 Political Equilibrium
We adopt Lindbeck and Weibull's (1987) probabilistic voting model in the operation
of the political mechanism. In this model, the equilibrium scal policy maximizes a
weighted sum of young and elderly voters' indirect utilities. The weights capture the
relative political clout of each group, reecting both relative sizes and (exogenous) voting
turnouts. Formally, the political objective function is given by:

(j;t; gj;t; gj;t+1;w
p
j ; w
r
j ; R) = !V
o
j;t + (1  !) 
 
V ypj;t + (1  )  V yrj;t

;
where ! 2 (0; 1) is the elderly agents' relative weight.1
Each country determines scal policy by the dynamic games between successive gen-
erations of voters. An international asset market clearing condition determines the world
interest rate. Given the assumption of small open economies, voters take the equilibrium
interest rate sequence as given.
We restrict this study to stationary Markov perfect equilibria. Voters base their strate-
gies only on the payo-relevant state variable. In our model, private wealth does not aect
elderly voters' political preferences. Therefore, the public debt, denoted by b, is the only
payo-relevant state variable. Hereafter, we omit time index t and use recursive notion
with x0 denoting next-period x.
Denition 1. A stationary Markov-perfect political equilibrium is an interest rate, R,
a stationary debt distribution fbjgj2fH;Lg, and a three-tuple hB;G; T i ; where B :
b;b
Wj<+ ! b;b is a debt rule, b0 = B(b;wpj ; wrj ; R); G : b;bWj<+ !
[0; g] is a government expenditure rule, g = G(b;wpj ; w
r
j ; R); and T :

b;b
 Wj 
<+ ! [0; 1] is a tax rule,  = T (b;wpj ; wrj ; R), such that the following conditions
hold:
(i) hB(bj;wpj ; wrj ; R); G(bj;wpj ; wrj ; R); T (bj;wpj ; wrj ; R)i = argmaxfb0;g;g

(j; gj; g
0
j;w
p
j ; w
r
j ; R), subject to (1), where g
0 = G(bj;w
p
j ; w
r
j ; R), and the
1Persson and Tabellini (2000, Chapter 3) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, Appendix B) provide
an explicit micro-foundation for this model. Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2012, Appendix B) outline
the process to derive the political objective function used in our study.
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government budget constraint is satised as follows:
B(bj;w
p
j ; w
r
j ; R) = G(bj;w
p
j ; w
r
j ; R) +Rbj   T (bj;wpj ; wrj ; R) w:
(ii) The international asset market clearing condition is
 fspH + (1  )srHg+ (1  ) fspL + (1  )srLg = b0H + (1  )b0L;
where b0j = B(b;w
p
j ; w
r
j ; R) and s
i
jt =
(R)
1 

1+(R)
1 

 (1  j;t)  wij.
We substitute V yij;t and V
oi
j;t into the political objective function 
 and obtain

(j; gj; g
0
j;w
p
j ; w
r
j ; R) =
1
1   
h
(1  !) 
n
1 + (R)
1 

o
 (1  j)1   ewj
+ f(1  !) + !g    (gj)1  + (1  !)  (g0j)1 

; (2)
where ewj  (wpj )1  + (1  )(wrj )1 :
The term ewj measures the impact of wage inequality on the political objective function.
Rising inequality in country j increases ewj if  > 1 (i.e., if 1= < 1), while it decreasesewj if  < 1 (i.e., if 1= > 1). The impact of inequality on ewj is crucial in the following
analysis.
The small open economies assumption implies that voters take the equilibrium interest
rate as given. Given R, the rst-order conditions with respect to gj and j are:
g0j
gj

= ( 1)  (1  !)
(1  !) + ! 
@G(b0j;w
p
j ; w
r
j ; !; R)
@b0j
; (3)
1 + (R)
1 

1  j  ( ewj)1= =

f(1  !) + !g
1  !
 1

 ( w) 1  1
gj
; (4)
where gj = G(bj;w
p
j ; w
r
j ; R), g
0
j = G(bj;w
p
j ; w
r
j ; R), j = T (bj;w
p
j ; w
r
j ; R), and b
0
j = gj +
Rbj  j w  B(bj;wpj ; wrj ; R). Appendix A.1 provides the derivations for these conditions.
Condition (3) is a generalized Euler equation for public goods provision. The term
@G(b0j;w
p
j ; w
r
j ; !; R)=@b
0
j on the right-hand side captures young voters' disciplining eect,
which is qualitatively similar to that demonstrated in Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti
(2012). The young agents' concern for future public goods provision controls current
scal policy and prevents the government from running up too much public debt. The
term (1 !)= f(1  !) + !g suggests that the disciplining eect strengthens as elderly
agents' preference weight for public goods, , increases.
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Condition (4) states that the government chooses a tax rate to equate the marginal
cost on the left-hand side to the marginal benet on the right-hand side. In particular, the
marginal cost depends on wage inequality within a generation captured by the term ewj.
Wage inequality aects public goods provision and public debt through the determination
of the tax rate. This point will be further investigated in the following analysis.
To nd policy functions that satisfy (3) and (4), we presume and verify linear equilib-
rium policy functions and obtain the following result:
Lemma 1. Given R and bj, country j's policy functions in a stationary Markov perfect
political equilibrium are given by
G(bj;w
p
j ; w
r
j ; R) = 

j  (b  bj);
T (bj;w
p
j ; w
r
j ; R) = 1 
n
1 + (R)
1 

o


(1  !)
f(1  !) + !g
 1


 ewj
w
 1

 j  (b  bj);
B(bj;w
p
j ; w
r
j ; R) =
b 

(1  !)
(1  !) + !  

j
 1

 (b  bj);
where j (> 0) satises the following condition:
R  j 
"
1 + w 
n
1 + (R)
1 

o


1  !
f(1  !) + !g
 1


 ewj
w
 1

#
= (j)
1
 

(1  !) 
(1  !) + !
 1

:
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Hereafter, we assume that a natural stability condition holds and focus on a steady-
state equilibrium where the relevant terms are constant across periods. Our task is to
determine the world interest rate and the associated steady-state debt distribution. We
thus rewrite the law of motion of debt in Lemma 1 as:
b  b0j = j 
 
b  bj

;
where
j = 
  wpj ; wrj ; R   (1  !) (1  !) + !  j
 1

:
We dene  as:
  max f (wpL; wrL; R) ;  (wpH ; wrH ; R)g :
Recall that there are two groups of countries, high- and low-inequality countries, de-
noted by j = H and L, respectively. Following Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2012),
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we can use the following to compute the steady-state world interest rate. First, there is
no country with 
 
wpj ; w
r
j ; R

> 1. Otherwise, either the high- or low-inequality coun-
tries would accumulate ever-increasing surpluses, while the other country groups could
accumulate a maximum debt of b. This condition prevents the international asset market
from clearing. Second, there is no R such that  < 1. Otherwise, both groups of countries
would accumulate a maximum public debt of b, which also prevents the international asset
market from clearing.
Given these two conditions, we can conclude that the steady-state equilibrium interest
rate is determined by  = 1. Because j is increasing in 

j , the countries with a higher 

j
are characterized by j = 1 and accumulate public debt below b, whereas countries with
a lower j are characterized by 

j < 1 and accumulate debt up to
b, which lowers them
into poverty. The following proposition shows that EIS determines the nancial balance
of low and high inequality countries.
Proposition 1. Consider a stationary Markov-perfect political equilibrium with the set
of policy functions in Lemma 1. The world interest rate R and the steady-state
distribution (bH ; bL) are as follows: (i) the world interest rate R
 satises L = 1
if  > 1, and H = 1 if  < 1; (ii) the steady-state debt distribution, (bH ; bL), is
b; L  b

if  > 1; and

H  b; b

if  < 1, where L and 

H are dened by
L  1  (1  ) 1 
"
1 + w (R)
1 
 

1  !
f(1  !) + !g
 1


 ewL
w
 1

 L
# 1
;
H  1 
"
v + (1  v) w (R) 1  

1  !
f(1  !) + !g
 1


 ewH
w
 1

 H
# 1
:
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Proposition 1 states that when  > 1, a high-inequality country has a high tax rate,
no public goods provision, and a high public debt level such that H = 1; gH = 0; and
bH = b; while a low-inequality country has low tax, high levels of public goods, and a
low public debt level such that L 2 (0; 1); gL > 0; and bL = L  b < b. The scal policy
direction reverses if  < 1. The result in Proposition 1 suggests that wage inequality and
EIS play key roles in explaining the dierences in scal policies between the two groups
of countries.
The result in Proposition 1 is somewhat extreme in the sense that either a low or a
high-inequality country is distinguished by a corner solution: 100% taxation, no provision
of public goods, and a debt level approaching the natural debt limit. This property stems
from the assumption of inelastic labor supply. If we alternatively assume an elastic labor
supply, either country group is distinguished by an interior solution (Song, Storesletten,
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and Zilibotti, 2012), which is more plausible from an empirical viewpoint. However,
our study adopts an inelastic labor supply assumption to simply obtain a solution and
demonstrate the correlation between inequality and scal policy.
To understand the role of wage inequality and EIS in shaping scal policy, recall the
rst-order conditions for j in (4). We can reformulate the expression in (4) as follows:

wpj (c
yp
j )
  + (1  )wrj (cyrj ) 

= ( 1)(g0j) 
@g0j
@b0j
w; (5)
where the left-hand side is the marginal cost of taxation and the right-hand side is the
marginal benet of taxation. Appendix A.4 provides the derivation of (5).
Given the assumption that average income levels are identical across countries, we
consider a mean-preserving spread of wage distribution to compare the two groups of
countries with similar average income levels but dierent levels of wage inequality. To
evaluate the impact of the spread, we focus on the i-type young agents' marginal cost of
taxation, wij(c
yi
j )
 , which is rewritten as:
wij(c
yi
j )
  = wij
(
wij (1  j)
1 + (R)
1 

) 
=
 
wij
1 ( (1  j)
1 + (R)
1 

) 
; i = p; r; (6)
where the rst equality is derived using the consumption function in Section 2.
The expression above suggests that an increase in the wages of the rich, wrj , has
two opposing eects on the marginal cost of taxation, wij(c
yi
j )
 . The rst is an in-
crease in the tax burden expressed by wrj , which increases the marginal cost of taxation
in response to an increase in the wage. The second eect is expressed by (cyij )
  =h
wij (1  j) =
n
1 + (R)
1 

oi 
, representing the marginal utility of consumption. A
one-unit increase in consumption caused by a rise in wages leads to a decrease in the
marginal utility of consumption. This term works to decrease the marginal cost of taxa-
tion.
The net eect depends on the magnitude of the elasticity of the marginal utility of con-
sumption, represented by . A higher  implies that the marginal utility of consumption
decreases further in response to an increase in wages. To examine 's role more precisely,
consider rst the case where  > 1. Eq. (6) indicates that the second eect outweighs
the rst. That is, a rise in the wages of the rich results in a decrease in their marginal
cost of taxation and thus an improvement in their utility. This result implies that the
rich tend to prefer a higher tax rate and a higher level of public goods provision as their
wages increase. However, the poor tend to prefer a lower tax rate and fewer public goods
because the mean-preserving spread of wage distribution is associated with a decline in
the wages of the poor.
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Having established the eect of wage inequality on the choice of tax rate and the
level of public goods provision, we keep the  > 1 assumption and consider the eect
of wage inequality on the choice of public bond issues. The mean-preserving spread of
wage distribution results in a widening gap in utility between the rich and the poor
when  > 1. The gap in utility incentivizes the government to smooth utility between
them by choosing a lower level of public goods provision in response to the spread of
wage distribution. However, the government can partially avoid decreasing public goods
provision by accumulating public debt. Therefore, higher inequality is associated with a
higher level of public debt when  > 1. When  < 1, the mean-preserving spread of wage
distribution leads to a shrinking, rather than widening, gap in utility between the rich
and the poor. Therefore, higher inequality is associated with a lower level of public debt
when  < 1.
To evaluate the empirical plausibility of the two conicting model predictions, we
review the empirical evidence from OECD countries for the past three decades. Table
1 presents the empirical investigation into the relationship between the Gini index and
public debt using cross-country panel data. The rst column shows the relationship
without control variables, while the second and third columns show the estimation results
for cases that include some control variables. The result indicates that the coecient on
the Gini index is positive and highly signicant. Azzimonti, de Francisco, and Quadrini
(2014) report a similar nding. Therefore, assuming that  > 1 (i.e., EIS is below one)
is an empirically valid perspective of inequality and public debt. This assumption is also
in line with many empirical EIS estimates (see, e.g., Kydland and Prescott, 1982; Hall,
1988; Campbell and Mankiw, 1989; Browning et al., 1999; Campbell, 1999).
[Table 1 here.]
4 Numerical Examples and Discussion
We provide numerical simulations to further evaluate the eects of the spread of wage
distribution on public debt, focusing on the case where  > 1. Figure 1 plots the tax rate
(Panel (a)), the level of public goods provision (Panel (b)), the debt-to-GDP ratio (Panel
(c)) in low-inequality countries, and the equilibrium interest rate (Panel (d)). The gure
shows how the mean-preserving spread of wage distribution in low-inequality countries
aects these variables. The results demonstrated in Panels (a), (b), and (c) support the
argument in the previous section: a rise in inequality in a country leads to decreases in
the tax rate and level of public goods provision as well as an increase in the debt-to-GDP
ratio.
[Figure 1 here.]
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To understand the eects on the interest rate and public debt in high-inequality coun-
tries, Panel (c) indicates that a rise in inequality in low-inequality countries increases the
public debt in those countries, implying an increase in the supply of public debt in the
international asset market that results in a decline in the price of public debt, that is,
an increase in the equilibrium interest rate as demonstrated in Panel (d).2 Because the
public debt level in high-inequality countries equals the natural debt limit, b = w=(R 1),
debt in high-inequality countries decreases in response to an increase in the interest rate.
This nding is relevant in terms of Azzimonti, de Francisco, and Quadrini's (2014)
investigation into the eect of rising income risk in a home country on the choice of
public debt in home and foreign countries. They present a model with two types of
agents: entrepreneurs who encounter investment risk and workers who face no risk. In
this setting, they show that higher risk strengthens entrepreneurs' demand for safe assets
(that is, public debt), thus reducing the interest rate. They also show that a lower
interest rate makes public debt more attractive for foreign countries. Therefore, their
results suggest that higher income risk in a home country results in more public debt
issues in home and foreign countries.
Azzimonti, de Francisco, and Quadrini (2014) argue that public debt responds posi-
tively to income inequality, provided that rising income inequality is associated with an
increase in individual income risk. Our study diers that we focus directly on income
inequality within a generation and show that the conict between the rich and the poor
does aect the choice of public debt through voting. In particular, we demonstrate that
rising inequality within a home country may result in an increase in its public debt and
a decrease in public debt in foreign countries, which is dierent from Azzimonti, de Fran-
cisco, and Quadrini's (2014) model prediction. Our study can be viewed as a component
of an alternative testable hypothesis for the relationship between inequality and public
debt from a political economy perspective.
2Appendix A.5 provides a formal proof of this statement.
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A Proofs
A.1 Derivation of (3) and (4)
We dierentiate (2) with respect to gj and j and obtain
f(1  !) + !g(gj)  + (1  !)(g0j) 
@g0j
@b0j
@b0j
@gj
= 0;
(1  !)
n
1 + (R)
1 

o
( 1)(1  j)  ewj + (1  !)(g0j)  @g0j@b0j @b
0
j
@j
= 0:
Using @b0j=@gj = 1 derived from the government budget constraint in (1), we can write
the rst expression as in (3). The second expression is rewritten as:n
1 + (R)
1 

o
(1  j)  ewj = ( 1)(g0j)  @g
0
j
@b0j
w
= 
(1  !) + !
1  ! w
1
(gj)
;
where we derive the rst equality using @b0j=@j =   w, and derive the second using (3).
By rearranging the terms, we obtain (4).

A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Recall the rst-order conditions with respect to gj and j, given by (3) and (4), respec-
tively. We substitute (4) into the government budget constraint and obtain:
b0j = gj +Rbj   w 
"
1 
n
1 + (R)
1 

o


1  !
f(1  !) + !g
 1


 ewj
w
 1

 gj
#
;
or
b0j = gj +Rbj   (R  1)b+ w 
n
1 + (R)
1 

o


1  !
f(1  !) + !g
 1


 ewj
w
 1

 gj; (7)
where we derive the second expression using w = (R  1)b.
To nd the solution satisfying (3), (4), and (7), we presume
g0j = j 
 
b  b0j

; (8)
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where j is an undetermined coecient. We substitute (8) into (3) and obtain 
j 
 
b  b0j

gj
!
= ( 1)  (1  !)
(1  !) + !  ( j) ;
or
b0j = b  (j)1= 1 

(1  !) 
(1  !) + !
 1

 gj:
Plugging this expression into (7) and rearranging the terms, we obtain
gj =
R   b  bj
1 + w 
n
1 + (R)
1 

o


1 !
f(1 !)+!g
 1
 
 ewj
w
 1

+ (j)
1

 1 

(1 !)
(1 !)+!
 1

:
Therefore, our estimate is veried if, for a given R, j satises the following condition:
j =
R
1 + w 
n
1 + (R)
1 

o


1 !
f(1 !)+!g
 1
 
 ewj
w
 1

+ (j)
1

 1 

(1 !)
(1 !)+!
 1

;
or
R  j 
"
1 + w 
n
1 + (R)
1 

o


1  !
f(1  !) + !g
 1


 ewj
w
 1

#
= (j)
1
 

(1  !) 
(1  !) + !
 1

: (9)
The left-hand side of (9), denoted by LHS, is decreasing in j with LHSjj=0 = R and
limj!1 LHS =  1. The right-hand side of (9), denoted by RHS, is increasing in j
with RHSjj=0 = 0 and limj!1RHS = 1. Therefore, there exists a unique j(> 0)
that satises (9). We can obtain the corresponding tax and debt policy functions by
substituting gj = j 
 
b  bj

into (4) and (7).

A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Given the argument in the text, each country's steady-state debt level, j(= H;L), bj,
satises (
bH < b and bL = b if 

H > 

L;
bH = b and bL < b if 

H < 

L;
(10)
13
where j (j = H;L) satises (9). The equation (9) implies that
H 7 L , ewH ? ewL: (11)
To compare ewH and ewL, we consider a mean-preserving spread of wage distribution;
that is increasing wages for the rich coupled with decreasing wages for the poor, keeping w
unchanged. Given the denition of w = wpj + (1  )wrj , the spread of wage distribution
results in
d w = 0, dwpj = ( 1)
1  

dwrj : (12)
Using (12), we can compute a change in ewj with:
d ewj =  (1  )  wpj   dwpj + (1  ) (1  )  wrj  dwrj
= (1  )


 
wpj
 
( 1)1  

dwrj + (1  )
 
wrj
 
dwrj

;
where we derive the second equality from (12).
The above expression is reformulated as
d ewj = (1  ) (1  ) 1 
wrj
   1 
wpj

!
dwrj ; (13)
where 1   > 0 and 1=  wrj   1=  wpj  < 0. This expression indicates that d ewj > 0 if
 > 1; and d ewj < 0 otherwise. That is, the mean-preserving spread of wage distribution
leads to ( ewH > ewL if  > 1;ewH < ewL if  < 1.
With (10) and (11), we obtain(
bH = b and bL < b if  > 1;
bH < b and bL = b if  < 1.
The remaining task is to determine R(> 0) and the public debt level of low-inequality
(high-inequality) countries for either case.
Case where  > 1.
Based on the argument above, we have ewH > ewL , H < L ,  (wpH ; wrH ; R) <
 (wpL; w
r
L; R). The results demonstrated in the text suggest that the equilibrium world
interest rate, R, satises
 (wpL; w
r
L; R) =

(1  !) 
(1  !) + !  

L
1=
= 1:
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The second equality determines L as follows:
L =
(1  !) + !
(1  !)  :
We substitute this into (9) with j = L to obtain
R   (1  !) + !
(1  !)  
"
1 + w 
n
1 + (R)
1 

o


1  !
f(1  !) + !g
 1


 ewL
w
 1

#
=

(1  !) + !
(1  !) 
 1



(1  !) 
(1  !) + !
 1

;
or,
R = 1 +
(1  !) + !
(1  !)  
"
1 + w 
n
1 + (R)
1 

o


1  !
f(1  !) + !g
 1


 ewL
w
 1

#
;
(14)
where R satises this condition.
To illustrate the scal policy for the case where  > 1, recall the policy functions
established in Lemma 1. Given that bH = bH , we can nd that scal policy in high-
inequality countries is distinguished by gH = 0 and H = 1. Given a 100 percent tax rate,
there is no saving in high-inequality countries: spH = s
r
H = 0.
Fiscal policy in low-inequality countries is distinguished by
gL = 

L 
 
b  bL

,
L = 1 
n
1 + (R)
1 

o


1  !
f(1  !) + !g
 1


 ewL
w
 1

 L 
 
b  bL

:
We substitute L into the saving function and obtain
spL = (R
)
1 
  wpL 

1  !
f(1  !) + !g
 1


 ewL
w
 1

 L 
 
b  bL

;
srL = (R
)
1 
  wrL 

1  !
f(1  !) + !g
 1


 ewL
w
 1

 L 
 
b  bL

:
Therefore, the aggregate saving in the world is
  (spL + (1  )srL) =   w  (R)
1 
 

1  !
f(1  !) + !g
 1


 ewL
w
 1

 L 
 
b  bL

;
where we use w  (wpL + (1  )wrL) to derive the expression.
The international asset market clearing condition is   (spL + (1  )srL) = bH+(1 
15
)bL, or,
  w  (R) 1  

1  !
f(1  !) + !g
 1


 ewL
w
 1

 L 
 
b  bL

= b+ (1  )bL;
where R is determined in (14). We compute the public debt level bL by solving the above
market clearing condition for bL.
Case where  < 1:
In this case, we have ewH < ewL , H > L ,  (wpH ; wrH ; R) >  (wpL; wrL; R). The
equilibrium world interest rate R satises
 (wpH ; w
r
H ; R) =

(1  !) 
(1  !) + !  

H
1=
= 1:
The second equality determines H as
H =
(1  !) + !
(1  !)  :
We substitute this equation into (9) with j = H to obtain
R = 1 +
(1  !) + !
(1  !)  
"
1 + w 
n
1 + (R)
1 

o


1  !
f(1  !) + !g
 1


 ewH
w
 1

#
;
(15)
where R satises this condition.
Given bL = b, scal policy in low-inequality countries is L = 1 and gL = 0. Given a
100 percent tax rate, there is no saving in low-inequality countries, and high-inequality
countries provide savings for the international asset market. Following the same procedure
in the  > 1 case, we can determine the international asset market clearing condition as
follows:
(1  )  w  (R) 1  

1  !
f(1  !) + !g
 1


 ewH
w
 1

 H 
 
b  bH

= bH + (1  )b;
where R satises (15). We compute the public debt level, bH by solving the above market
clearing condition for bH .

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A.4 Derivation of Eq. (5)
We rst reformulate Eq. (4) as 
1 + (R)
1 

1  j
!
 ewj = f(1  !) + !g
1  !  w 
1
(gj)
 :
The left-hand side, denoted by LHS, becomes
LHS =
 
1 + (R)
1 

1  j
!
 (wpj )1  + (1  )(wrj )1 
=

wpj
cypj

 (wpj )1  +

wrj
cyrj

 (1  )(wrj )1 
= wpj 
 
cypj
 
+ (1  )wrj 
 
cyrj
 
;
where the rst equality comes from the denition of ewj and the second equality comes
from the consumption function.
The right-hand side, denoted by RHS, becomes
RHS =
f(1  !) + !g
1  !  w  ( 1) 
(1  !) 
(1  !) + !
 
g0j
   @g0j
@b0j
=  (g0j) 
@g0j
@b0j
w;
where the rst equality comes from Eq. (3).

A.5 Eect of Inequality on R when  > 1
Recall Eq. (14), which determines the equilibrium interest rate when  > 1. Eq. (14)
has the following properties. The left-hand side, denoted by LHS, is increasing in R
with LHSjR=1 = 0 and limR!+1 LHS = +1. The right-hand side, denoted by RHS,
is decreasing in R with RHSjR=1 > 1 and limR!+1RHS 2 (1;+1). Given that the
term ewL on the right-hand side of Eq. (14) increases in response to the spread in wage
distribution, we can verify that mean-preserving spread of wage distribution increases R
when  > 1.

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B Estimation Procedure and Data Description
The estimated regression of the form is
ln (Gross Debtj;t) = 0 + j + 1  ln (Gini Indexj;t) + X Xj;t + uj;t;
where j denotes country, t denotes year, j is the xed country-specic eect, Gross Debt
is the ratio of general government gross debt to GDP, Gini Index is the estimated Gini
index for household gross (pre-tax, pre-transfer) income, X is a vector of control variables,
and u is the residual containing country- and year-xed eects.
The rst column in Table 1 reports the estimated results without control variables. The
second column reports the results when we include Government Expenditure measured
by the ratio of general government total expenditure to GDP as a control variable. The
third column reports the results when we further include Age Dependency Ratio, which
is the ratio of dependents older than 64 years of age to the working-age population aged
from 15 to 64 years.
We obtain the data for the ratio of general government gross debt to GDP and the
ratio of general government total expenditure to GDP from the World Economic Outlook
database (IMF, 2012). The Gini index (Solt, 2009) is the estimated index of inequality
in household gross (pre-tax, pre-transfer) income. We obtain the age dependency ratio
from World Development Indicators (World Bank). The sample period is 1980{2010 and
the sample countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel,
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Por-
tugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and
the United States.
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(1) (2) (3)
ln(Gini Index)
0.000
0:9921***
(0:1436)
1:0878***
(0:1169)
0:6986***
(0:1239)
ln(Government Expenditure)
0.000
2:1334***
(0:1121)
1:8885***
(0:1127)
ln(Age Dependency Ratio)
0.000
0:7880***
(0:1051)
Constant
0.000
0:0783
(0:5396)
 8:2150***
(0:6187)
 8:2031***
(0:5958)
R-squared 0.006 0.1748 0.1714
Number of observations 749 742 742
Number of countries 34 34 34
Table 1: Country xed-eect regression results. The dependent variable is the logarithm
of general government gross debt. The estimation procedure and data descriptions are
given in Appendix B.
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Figure 1: The gure depicts the eects of the mean-preserving spread of wage distribution
in low-inequality countries on the tax rate (Panel (a)), the level of public goods provision
(Panel (b)), the debt-to-GDP ratio (Panel (c)) in low-inequality countries, and the equilib-
rium interest rate R (Panel (d)). The horizontal axis takes wrL=w
p
L in all panels. The pa-
rameters are set as  = 1=0:66; ! = 0:25;  = (0:973)30 ;  = 2:2;  = 0:8;  = 2:0; v = 0:2;
and w = 1: The value of  is taken from Kydland and Prescott (1982) and the values for
!; ; and  are taken from Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2012).
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